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NOTES
CHILDREN: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES DECIDED
PURSUANT TO THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE
ACT OF 1978
Therese Buthod
The congressional committee, in introducing the Indian Child
Welfare Act, commented that there is no resource more vital to
the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their
children.' This note will discuss the problems of Indian child
placement that led to the passage of the Act, the Act itself, and
an analysis of cases decided since the enactment of the Indian
Child Welfare Act.
Background of the Act
An alarmingly high percentage of Indian families have been
broken up by the often unwarranted removal of their children by
nontribal public and private agencies. Many of these children are
placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions,2
a problem addressed by Russell Lawrence Barsh in his article
"The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A Critical Analysis." 3
Referring to statements made during the hearings before the
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs,4 Barsh states:
The costs of massive displacement of Indian children from
their homes and tribes have been severe. Prolonged substitute
care during youth has been associated with high alcohol abuse
and suicide rates within the Indian population. Psychiatrists
report that Indians raised in non-Indian homes tend to have
significant social problems in adolescence and adulthood. Ac-
cording to a report prepared in 1975 for the American
Academy of Child Psychiatry, "there is much clinical evidence
to suggest that these Native American children placed in off-
1. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (1976).
2. Id. § 1901(4).
3. Barsh, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A Critical Analysis, 31 HASTINGS
L.J. 1287 (1980). For an in-depth analysis of the Act, see Note, Conflict of Laws: The
Plurality of Legal Systems: An Analysis of 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63, The Indian Child
Welfare Act, 8 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 333 (1980).
4. Hearings on S. 1214 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th
Cong., Ist Sess., 1977.
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reservation, non-Indian homes are at risk in their later develop-
ment. Often enough they are cared for by devoted and well in-
tentioned foster or adoptive parents. Nonetheless, particularly
in adolescence, they are subject to ethnic confusion and a per-
vasive sense of abandonment." Frequently when these children
become adults they find themselves being treated as Indians,
but do not know how to behave as Indians. 5
As stated in the above quotation, these foster or adoptive
families may have been devoted and well intentioned. Even so,
this does not alleviate the problem these Indian children have in
accepting their identity as an Indian in a non-Indian environ-
ment. State courts and welfare agencies often believe that they
are looking out for "the best interest of the child" by placing
Indian children in non-Indian homes. This belief is the result of
cultural bias on the part of the court and social workers involved
in the removal of the children. The fallacious character of this
bias was exposed in the legislative development of the Indian
Child Welfare Act 6:
In judging the fitness of a particular family, many social
workers, ignorant of Indian cultural values and social norms,
make decisions that are wholly inappropriate in the context of
Indian family life and so they frequently discover neglect or
abandonment where none exists.
For example, the dynamics of Indian extended families are
largely misunderstood. An Indian child may have scores of,
perhaps more than a hundred, relatives who are counted as
close, responsible members of the family. Many social workers
untutored in the ways of Indian family life or assuming them
to be socially irresponsible, consider leaving the child with per-
sons outside the nuclear family as neglect and thus as grounds
for terminating parental rights.7
Before passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act, a child's tribe
had little or no impact on the decision as to placement of the
child. Tribes were given very limited jurisdiction in child custody
matters. If the child did not reside or was not domiciled on the
reservation, there was very little opportunity for the tribe to exer-
5. Barsh, supra note 3, at 1287, 1290, quoting from Hearings, supra note 4, at 114
(Statements of Drs. Carl Mindcl and Alan Gurwitt, American Academy of Child
Psychiatry).
6. 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7530.
7. Id. at 7532.
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cise any authority. The tide began to turn when in 1975 a case
arose in Maryland dealing with VISTA volunteers assigned to the
Crow Reservation in Montana. The Wakefields, who were non-
Indians, were appointed legal guardians of an Indian child by the
Crow Tribal Court. The Wakefields filed for permanent custody
of the child in the state court of Maryland. In the meantime, the
Crow Tribal Court in Montana terminated the guardianship over
the child and returned legal custody to the mother. The mother
moved to dismiss the Wakefields' claim for permanent custody
on the ground that the state court lacked jurisdiction. The
Maryland Court of Appeals decided in Wakefield v. Little Light'
that the lower court's judgment granting the dismissal of the peti-
tion for want of jurisdiction was proper. The court adopted the
rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Lee9 stating
that states may only act "where essential tribal relations were not
involved and where the rights of Indians would not be jeopar-
dized." The court ruled that child rearing is an "essential tribal
relation" and that the Crow Tribe possessed the requisite judicial
authority to protect this essential tribal relation.10
The United States Supreme Court decided Fisher v. District
Court" the following year. This case dealt with a child who was
found to be neglected by her mother, Alva Fisher, a member of
the Northern Cheyenne Tribe. After the tribal court found the
child neglected, it awarded temporary custody to Josephine Runs-
above, another tribal member. The tribal court later returned
custody to the mother. However, before the new custody order
was final, Josephine Runsabove initiated an adoption proceeding
in the Montana court. The Montana Supreme Court held that the
state court had jurisdiction to hear the matter and Fisher ap-
pealed. The United States Supreme Court ruled that state court
jurisdiction would interfere with the power of self-government
conferred upon the Northern Cheyenne Tribe. 2 The Court con-
cluded that a tribal court has jurisdiction over a child domiciled
on the reservation.
Both of these cases were steps toward enhancing the tribe's and
the Indian family's power in matters concerning their children.
Still, much more remained to be done to alleviate the problems
8. 347 A.2d 228 (Md. 1975).
9. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
10. 347 A.2d 228, 234 (Md. 1975).
11. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
12. Id. at 387.
1982]
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encountered by many Indian families and children who had been
separated by the children's placement outside the home.
The Act Itself
The Indian Child Welfare Act of 197813 was signed into law by
President Carter on November 8, 1978, after nearly four years of
hearings and investigations conducted by Congress. In describing
the purpose of the Act, Congress declared:
[I]t is the policy of this Nation to protect the best interests of
Indian children and to promote the stability and security of In-
dian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Fed-
eral standards for the removal of Indian children from their
families and the placement of such children in foster or adop-
tive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian cul-
ture, and by providing for assistance to Indian tribes in the
operation of child and family service programs. 1
The Act deals with the following child custody proceedings:
1. Foster care placement, which is an action removing a child
from his parents or Indian custodian for temporary placement in
a foster home or institution, where parental rights have not been
terminated but the parent or Indian custodian may not have the
child returned upon demand.
2. Termination of parental rights, which is any action ter-
minating the parent-child relationship.
3. Preadoptive placement, which is the temporary placement
of the child in a foster home or institution after the termination
of parental rights.
4. Adoptive placement, which is the permanent placement of
an Indian for adoption, including any action resulting in a final
decree of adoption. 5
An "Indian child" for purposes of the Act is any unmarried
person who is under eighteen and is either a member of an Indian
tribe or is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. 16 It should be
noted that the Act does not cover delinquency proceedings in-
volving an Indian child, nor does it cover child custody awards in
divorce proceedings.
13. Pub. L. 95-608, 25 U.S.C. § 1901.
14. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1976).
15. Id. § 1903.1.
16. Id. § 1903.4.
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As previously stated, Indian children often live with members
of their extended family. The Act states that an extended family
member should be defined by the law or custom of the Indian
child's tribe, or in the absence of such law or custom, shall be a
person at least eighteen years of age who is the child's grand-
parent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-
in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or step-parent.' 7
Other definitions will be discussed as they appear in the context
of the cases.
One of the most difficult problems in many Indian law cases is
determining who has jurisdiction of the matter. The Act has set
forth procedures to follow in order to determine who has
jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings. The jurisdic-
tional requirements are divided into three categories.
First, the tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction over any child
custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is
domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except where such
jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the state by existing federal law.
Where an Indian child is a ward of a tribal court, the Indian tribe
shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence
or domicile of the child.18
Second, in a state court proceeding for the foster care place-
ment of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child not
domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian child's
tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause to the contrary,
shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe. This
transfer should be made, unless there is objection by either
parent, upon the petition of either parent, or the Indian custo-
dian or the Indian child's tribe, provided "that such transfer shall
be subject to declination by the tribal court of the child's
tribe.""
Third, during any state proceeding for the foster care place-
ment of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child, the
Indian custodian of the child and the Indian child's tribe shall
have the right to intervene at any point in the proceeding.20
The United States, every state, every territory or possession of
the United States, and every Indian tribe shall give full faith and
17. Id. § 1903.2.
18. Id. § 1911(a).
19. Id. § 1911(b).
20. Id. § 1911(c).
19821
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credit to the public acts, records, and proceedings of an Indian
tribe applicable to Indian child custody proceedings. 21
The Act further provides that in any involuntary proceeding in
a state court, where the court knows or has reason to know an
Indian child is involved, the court shall notify the parent or In-
dian custodian and the Indian child's tribe, by registered mail
with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and of
the parties' right to intervene. 22 An indigent parent or Indian
custodian has the right to court-appointed counsel in any
removal, placement, or termination proceedings. 23 The parties are
also given the right to examine relevant documents filed with the
court.24 Any party seeking foster care placement or termination
of parental rights must satisfy the court that active efforts have
been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative pro-
grams designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and
that these efforts were unsuccessful.25
In order for foster care placement to become effectuated there
must be clear and convincing evidence, including testimony of
qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child
by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child. 6 Termination of
parental rights may only be ordered if the evidence is beyond a
reasonable doubt that the continued custody of the child by the
parent or legal custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or
physical damage to the child. 27
The Act also deals with the issue of a parent or Indian custo-
dian voluntarily consenting to foster care placement or to ter-
mination of parental rights. Such consent will not be valid unless
in writing and recorded before a judge of a court of competent
jurisdiction and accompanied by the presiding judge's certificate
that the terms and consequences of the consent were explained in
detail. The judge must also certify that the parent fully
understood the explanation, which was given either in English or
translated into a language the parent understood. Any consent
given prior to or within ten days after the birth of an infant will
not be valid.28
21. Id. § 1911(d).
22. Id. § 1912(a).
23. Id. § 1912(b).
24. Id. § 1912(c).
25. Id. § 1912(d).
26. Id. § 1912(e).
27. Id. § 1912(0.
28. Id. § 1913(a).
[Vol. 10
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If a parent voluntarily consents to foster care, that consent
may be withdrawn at any time; at such time the child shall be
returned to the parent or guardian. 29 A parent may withdraw
consent for a voluntary proceeding for termination of parental
rights at any time prior to the final decree of termination or
adoption.3 0 Even after the final decree of adoption the parent
may withdraw consent for a period of up to two years if that
parent can show that the consent was obtained through fraud or
duress. 3'
The Act further provides that any child who is the subject of
foster care placement or termination proceedings, or that child's
parent or Indian custodian, may, like the child's tribe, petition
any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate such proceeding
upon a showing that the action violated any provisions of sec-
tions 1911, 1912, and 1913 of the Act. 2
Certain criteria have been established for the placement of
Indian children. In an adoptive placement of an Indian child
under state law, unless good cause to the contrary is shown,
preference shall be given to placement with (1) a member of the
child's extended family, (2) other members of. the Indian child's
tribe, or (3) other Indian families. 3
In determining foster care or preadoptive placement for an
Indian child, the least restrictive setting which most approximates
a family and which meets the child's special needs should be
used. The child should also be placed within reasonable proximity
to his or her home. Preference shall be given, in the absence of
good cause to the contrary, to placement with:
1. a member of the Indian child's extended family,
2. a foster home licensed, approved, or specified by the
Indian child's tribe,
3. an Indian foster home licensed or approved by an
authorized non-Indian licensing authority, or
4. an institution for children approved by an Indian tribe or
operated by an Indian organization which has a program suitable
to meet the Indian child's needs.
34
If an Indian child's tribe establishes a different order of
preference, the court or agency effecting placement should follow
29. Id. § 1913(b).
30. Id. § 1913(c).
31. Id. § 1913(d).
32. Id. § 1914.
33. Id. § 1915(a).
34. Id. § 1915(b).
1982] .
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such preference. The preference of the parent or child may also
be considered." A record shall be maintained by the state and
made available to the Indian child's tribe, or the Secretary of the
Interior upon request, evidencing the efforts made to comply
with the order of preference. 36
Whenever a previous adoption of an Indian child has been
vacated or adoptive parents consent to termination of their
parental rights, the parent or prior Indian custodian may petition
for return of custody. The petition should be granted unless there
is a showing it would not be in the best interest of the child."
The Act has made provisions for an Indian individual at least
eighteen years of age, who has been adopted, to petition the court
that entered the final decree for disclosure of his tribal affiliation,
his biological parents, and other information that may be
necessary to protect rights stemming from the individual's tribal
relationship."
An Indian tribe that has become subject to state jurisdiction
pursuant to federal law may reassume jurisdiction over child
custody proceedings. Before reassuming jurisdiction, the tribe
must present to the Secretary of the Interior a petition that in-
cludes a suitable plan to exercise such jurisdiction. 9
The Act authorizes Indian tribes and states to enter into
agreements with each other respecting care and custody of Indian
children and jurisdiction over child custody matters. It also pro-
vides for revocation of these agreements by either party. 40
If an Indian child is improperly removed from the custody of
the parent or Indian custodian by the petitioner in any child
custody proceeding, the court shall decline jurisdiction over the
matter and return the child to his parent or Indian custodian,
unless the return would subject the child to a substantive and im-
mediate danger or threat of such danger.4'
If any state or federal law applies a higher standard of protec-
tion to the rights of the parent or Indian custodian than the Act
requires, then the state or federal standard should apply.42
Nothing in the Act prevents the emergency removal .of an
35. Id. § 1915(c).
36. Id. § 1915(e).
37. Id. § 1916(a).
38. Id. § 1917.
39. Id. § 1918(a).
40. Id. § 1919.
41. Id. § 1920.
42. Id. § 1921.
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Indian child who is domiciled on the reservation, but temporarily
located off the reservation, from his parent or Indian custodian,
or the emergency placement of such child in a foster home in
order to prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the child.
This removal or placement shall terminate immediately when it is
no longer necessary to prevent imminent physical damage or
harm to the child.43
Most of the provisions of this Act did not apply to child
custody proceedings that were initiated or completed prior to 180
days after November 8, 1978. The provisions would apply to any
subsequent proceedings in the same matter or subsequent pro-
ceedings affecting the custody or placement of the same child.44
Subchapter II of the Act authorizes the Secretary of the In-
terior to make grants to Indian tribes and organizations to
establish and operate Indian child and family service programs on
or near reservations. The Act specifies that the objective of every
Indian child and family service program shall be to prevent the
breakup of Indian families and, in particular, to ensure that the
permanent removal of an Indian child from the custody of his
parent or Indian custodian shall be utilized only as a last resort.4"
Subchapter III directs the Secretary of the Interior to collect
and maintain records of all Indian child placements from its
enactment forward.4 6
Cases Decided Under the Act
State courts must ask themselves a critical question in dealing
with Indian children: Does the Indian Child Welfare Act apply?
If so, to what extent should the state or tribal court be involved?
To date most cases appealed on the grounds of the Indian Child
Welfare Act deal specifically with whether the Act applies.
In In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action,"7 the domicile
of an Indian infant was placed in question by the parties in the
case. A 15-year-old Assiniboine Indian living on the Fort Belknap
Reservation in Montana had a baby on February 27, 1980. She
voluntarily relinquished parental rights to the Nevada Catholic
Welfare Bureau twenty days later; she had the option to
withdraw this relinquishment any time prior to the final adoption
43. Id. § 1922.
44. Id. § 1923.
45. Id. § 1931(a).
46. Id. § 1951.
47. 635 P.2d 187 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
1982]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1982
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
decree. The girl withdrew her consent on October 2, 1980, but the
adoptive family living in Arizona refused to return the child. A
petition for termination of parental rights was filed in Arizona on
October 27, 1980. The vice-chairman of the tribe requested the
Arizona court to transfer the case to the tribal court in Montana.
The state court refused and terminated the girl's parental rights
on the grounds that she had abandoned the child and stated
further that removal of the child from his preadoptive home and
his return to his mother would result in serious emotional or
physical damage to him.
The appellate court determined that the infant's domicile was
that of his mother until it had been legally changed. It further
stated that the jurisdictional standard should be based on the
ethnic origin of the child rather than the geographic concept of
presence or domicile since the tribe or parent can intervene and
request that the case be transferred to tribal court. The court
found that evidence concerning the mother's fitness was better
able to be determined in tribal court because witnesses lacking
knowledge of the tribal culture or values may not be qualified to
give an opinion.
Another important issue that must be decided by the court is
whether the child is an Indian or eligible to be a member of a
tribe. The court failed to make this determination in In re
C.R.M.48 The child's mother's attorney asked that the case be
dismissed at the outset because the trial court did not comply
with the Act. The motion was denied; the child was adjudicated
dependent and neglected and placed in the custody of the Depart-
ment of Social Services. The mother informed the court that she
was a member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe and her child was eligi-
ble for membership, but the court refused to acknowledge the
child as Indian and refused to comply with the Act. The South
Dakota Supreme Court remanded the case to determine whether
the child was Indian and thus whether application of the Act was
proper.
A similar case arose in Oklahoma in In re J.B.49 An ad-
judicatory hearing was held before a jury to determine whether
J.B. was a deprived child. The child's mother, who claimed to be
an Indian, requested that the jury be instructed to use the
standard of clear and convincing evidence to prove that her child
48. 307 N.W.2d 131 (S.D. 1981).
49. 643 P.2d 306 (OkIa. 1982).
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was deprived. The court refused to use this instruction and
directed the jury to use the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard. The Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the lower
court's decision, stating that the transcript did not sufficiently
establish the mother's status as an Indian to provide her the
benefits of the Indian Child Welfare Act.
In both of these cases it appears that the trial court chose to ig-
nore the Act completely even after the Act had been brought to
the court's attention. In the first case this led to the remand and
retrial of a case that could have been disposed of more efficiently
had the trial judge determined the child's eligibility for member-
ship in the tribe. The upholding of the decision in the second case
may have violated a right which the mother, if Indian, was
guaranteed under 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e).
In In re Adoption of Baby Boy L.5 0 the Kansas Supreme Court
seems to have interpreted the Act in a manner much narrower
than most courts in order to find that the case was not subject to
the Act. The mother, a non-Indian, consented to adoption of the
baby, specifying who the adoptive parents would be. The father,
a five-eighths Kiowa Indian and an enrolled member of the tribe,
did not consent to the adoption. The parents were not married,
but paternity was not disputed. A hearing was held to determine
whether the father was unfit and whether his parental rights
should be terminated. The hearing was continued and notice was
given to the Kiowa Tribe of the proceedings. The father filed an
answer, claiming that the Indian Child Welfare Act applied and
requested that the child be placed with a member of his extended
family or other member of the tribe; the Kiowa Tribe filed a peti-
tion to intervene in the proceedings. The court determined that
the father was unfit; thus his parental rights were terminated and
the court stated that his consent was not necessary for the adop-
tion. While these proceedings were pending the baby was enrolled
as a member of the Kiowa Tribe.
The Kansas Supreme Court held that the Act did not apply to
"this type" of case. It stated in part that:
The Act is concerned with establishing proper definitions and
safeguards in the situation where Indian children are being
removed from their families by reason of child neglect, abuse,
or similar grounds. These issues are not present in an adoption
proceeding instituted on the voluntary consent of a non-Indian
50. 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982).
1982]
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unwed mother of an illegitimate child, where that child's care
and custody has, with the natural mother's permission, been
with non-Indian proposed adoptive parents since the child's
birth."
The court goes on to justify its position by stating:
[T]he underlying thread that runs throughout the entire Act to
the effect that the Act is concerned with the removal of Indian
children from an existing Indian family unit and the resultant
breakup of the Indian family. In this case Baby Boy L. is only
5/16th Kiowa Indian, has never been removed from an Indian
family and so long as the mother is alive to object, would
probably never become a part of the Perciado or any other In-
dian family. While it is true that this Act could have been more
clearly and precisely drawn, we are of the opinion that to apply
the Act to a factual situation such as the one before us would
be to violate the policy and intent of Congress rather than
uphold them.2
This reasoning could exclude Indian babies that were placed
for adoption at birth as they would have never "been removed
from an Indian family" in the terms this court uses. This is cer-
tainly not the intent behind the Act. If the trial court was
opposed to transferring the case to the tribal court, it should have
attempted to show good cause why the case should not be trans-
ferred. 3
Most of the cases dealing with whether the Act should apply
pertain to the effective date of the Act and the question of what
is a subsequent procedure."4
In E.A. v. State55 the Alaska Supreme Court held that when
parental rights were terminated prior to the effective date of the
Act and the children were placed in an adoptive home after the
effective date, the Act did not apply. The children's grandmother
claimed that the Act should have governed the adoption since the
placement occurred after the effective date of the Act. The court
stated the placement was merely the completion of the entire ad-
ministrative process of locating and selecting an adoptive home.
51. Id. at 175.
52. Id.
53. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1976).
54. Id. § 1923.
55. 623 P.2d 1210 (Alaska 1980).
[Vol. I0
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The Act would be applicable to any future adoptive proceedings,
including the final decree of adoption, at which time the grand-
mother might assert her preference as to the placement according
to the court.
By allowing the grandmother a right to be heard at the final
adoption hearing, the Alaska court was much more lenient in its
interpretation of the Act than most other jurisdictions. For exam-
ple, in Montana the court refused to follow the Act in the follow-
ing situation: A mother's parental rights to her three children
were terminated, and she asked that the case be transferred to the
Chippewa Cree Tribe. The court refused because the petition was
filed on March 1, 1979, and the Act did not take effect until May
7, 1979. Two months after the effective date, the hearing was
held on the father's parental rights. The court stated that it would
not transfer this hearing because it was a continuation of the
action initiated by the state previously. The proceeding was not
terminated until the parental rights of both parents had been ad-
judicated.16
In In re Adoption of Baby Nancy," a case where adoption pro-
ceedings were begun prior to the effective date of the Act and the
parental consent was later withdrawn, the court again ruled that
the Act did not apply. Its reasoning was that "Congress could
not have intended any adoption of an Indian child, no matter
when completed, to be upset by a subsequent action to vacate." 8
The Act by its terms applies to "any subsequent proceeding in
the same matter or subsequent proceeding affecting the custody
or placement of the same child."5 9 In the following two cases the
courts did not find that the hearing was a subsequent proceeding,
even though more than a year had passed since any prior hear-
ings.
In Birdhead v. Tal 60 the child was found dependent and
neglected on July 29, 1977 and parental rights were terminated at
that hearing, but the appellate court vacated the termination
order on December 22, 1977. A dispositional hearing was set for
October 30, 1978, but continued sixteen months to February 12,
1980, and a decision was not rendered until June 16, 1980. The
56. In re T.J.D., 615 P.2d 212 (Mont. 1980).
57. 616 P.2d 1263 (Wash. App. 1980).
58. Id. at 1266.
59. 25 U.S.C. § 1923 (1976).
60. 308 N.W.2d 837 (Neb. 1981).
1982]
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appellant argued that the dispositional hearing was a subsequent
proceeding and thus should have been covered by the Act. The
Supreme Court of Nebraska held that it was a single action in-
itiated upon filing of the petition on June 8, 1977.
South Dakota ruled similarly in the case of In re R.N. A peti-
tion was filed for the termination of parental rights to five
children on March 22, 1978. The father's rights were terminated
soon thereafter, but the petition for terminating the mcther's
rights was held in abeyance specifying conditions for the mother
to follow. The mother returned to court December 10, 1979 and
her parental rights were terminated without the benefit of the Act
because, the court stated, the hearing was a continuance rather
than a subsequent proceeding.
The Interior and Insular Affairs Committee of the House of
Representatives gave the following examples of actions that
would be considered subsequent proceedings:
For instance, if the foster care placement of an Indian child
was initiated or completed prior to enactment and then, subse-
quent to enactment, the child was replaced for foster care or
an action for termination of parental rights was initiated, or
the child was placed in a preadoptive situation, or he was
placed for adoption, the provisions of the Act would be ap-
plicable to those subsequent actions. 6
It would appear that the cases cited should have fallen under
the Act. By the reasoning used in the cases, the example given by
Congress would not have been a subsequent proceeding because it
all would have stemmed from the initial adjudication of the child
as "dependent and neglected." Especially would this be true if
the child was placed in an adoptive home because the court would
probably reason that the foster home placement was an in-
termediate step between the initiation of the action and the
culmination at the final adoption.
Another problem arises in deciding if the Act is applicable to
cases where there is a dispute about a child's custody among
family members. Two cases have dealt with this and have reached
opposite conclusions.
The Alaska Supreme Court held in A.B.M. v. M.H.63 that the
Act should be followed even if the custody dispute is between
61. 303 N.W.2d 102 (S.D. 1981).
62. 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7548.
63. 651 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1982).
[Vol. 10
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members of the same family. In this case A.B.M. had a baby and
gave up the baby for adoption to her sister M.H. and her hus-
band. This adoption was vacated on a motion by the Department
of Health and Social Services on the grounds that the Department
had not made an evaluation of the adoptive home. A.B.M. peti-
tioned the court to return custody to her under 25 U.S.C. § 1916.
The court stated that the Act did not control and decided it was
in the best interest of the child that custody remain with M.H. On
appeal the Native American Rights Fund submitted an amicus
curiae brief and argued along with A.B.M. that she was entitled
to the safeguards of the Act. The adoptive parents, along with
the state of Alaska, filing an amicus curiae brief, reasoned that
the Act only applies in the removing of Indian children from their
homes by nonfamily public or private agencies. They contended
that adoption by members of a child's extended family will not
deprive the child of exposure to Indian cultural or social values
the Act is designed to safeguard.
The appellate court ruled that the lower court erred by not
following the Act. They stated that the protection of the Act was
not intended to apply to prospective adoptive parents against
whom an adoption decree was vacated when the natural parent is
seeking custody.
Montana held in In re Bertleson6" that the Act did not apply
because the case involved an internal family dispute between the
non-Indian mother and paternal grandparents of the child.
Another case concerning a relative caring for the child is State
ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. England.61 This case dealt with the ques-
tion of whether the maternal aunt acting as a foster parent was
considered an "Indian custodian" and thus entitled to notice
prior to termination of foster care placement. An "Indian custo-
dian" as defined by the Act is "any Indian person who has legal
custody of an Indian child under tribal law or custom or under
state law, or to whom temporary physical care, custody and con-
trol has been transferred by the parent of such child.""" The
Oregon court ruled that the aunt was not an Indian custodian
because "as a general matter foster parents who are paid for their
temporary provision of room and board to children of others
have no statutory rights on termination of their status." ' 67 The
64. 617 P.2d 121 (Mont. 1980).
65. 640 P.2d 608 (Or. 1982).
66. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(b) (1976).
67. State ex. rel. Juvenile Dep't v. England, 640 P.2d 608, 613 (Or. 1982).
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court also pointed out that Indian foster parents are not included
in the definition of "Indian custodian."
It is ironic that if the child's aunt was not acting as a foster
mother, but the child was still living with her, she would receive
notice and have an opportunity to intervene in matters dealing
with the child. Indian foster homes are a limited resource in every
tribe and decisions such as this do little to encourage the develop-
ment of more foster homes. Further, the purpose behind the pro-
tection of the rights of the child's legal custodian in most provi-
sions of the Act was explained by Congress as follows:
Because of the extended family concept in the Indian com-
munity, parents often transfer physical custody of the Indian
child to such extended family member on an informal basis,
often for extended periods of time and at great distances from
the parents. While such custodian may not have the rights
under state law, they do have rights under Indian custom
which this bill seeks to protect including the right to protect the
parental interests of the parents.68
Cases may also be appealed on the grounds that the state did
not transfer jurisdiction to the tribe when requested or for other
grounds dealing with the tribe's extraterritorial jurisdiction. In In
re M.E.M.,69 the Standing Rock Sioux Indian Tribe requested
jurisdiction be transferred from state court in Billings, Montana,
to the tribal court. The welfare worker wrote the tribe and in-
formed it that the welfare office would resist transfer of jurisdic-
tion unless the tribal court's plans for disposition of the case were
first stated. The case was not transferred and the mother's paren-
tal rights were terminated.
The appellate court reversed and remanded the case with in-
structions that the trial court must first decide the jurisdictional
issue. It further directed the lower court that the burden of show-
ing "good cause to the contrary" must be carried by the state
with clear and convincing evidence that the best interest of the
child would be injured by transfer.
Good cause to the contrary includes but is not limited to the
following circumstances:
1. The child's biological parents are unavailable;
2. No Indian custodian has been appointed;
68. 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7543 (emphasis added).
69. 635 P.2d 1313 (Mont. 1981).
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3. The child has little contact with the tribe for a significant
period of time;
4. The child has not resided on the reservation for a signifi-
cant period of time;
5. The child, being over twelve years of age, has indicated op-
position to the transfer.7 0
The matter of a tribe's right to intervention and to extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction was discussed in In re S.Z. & C.Z.7' In this
case proceedings were held to adjudicate S.Z. and C.Z., two
dependent and neglected children. The mother was a member of
the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, the father was non-Indian. The parents
waived the right to counsel, did not want the matter transferred
to tribal court, and consented to foster care placement. The
following notice was sent to the tribe. "Enclosed please find 2
Affidavits regarding the above children. These affidavits are
notice to you under the Indian Child Welfare Act."
Parental rights were terminated; the parents later petitioned the
court to set aside the decree, alleging that the Act was violated
due to improper notice given to the tribe. The decree was set
aside, the tribe gave notice of intervention, and the parents con-
sented to the transfer of jurisdiction to the tribe. The state sur-
rendered custody of the children to the tribe.
The state appealed, claiming that the notice given complied
with the requirements of 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a). The South Dakota
Supreme Court ruled that although the notice was "not as artful-
ly drafted as it could have been," it was sufficient and overruled
the appellate court. The court appears to have believed that
notice was not very important since the parents had objected to a
transfer of the case to tribal court. It should be noted that even if
a parent objects to transfer, the tribe continues to have a right to
intervene. In his dissent in In re S.Z. & C.Z., Justice Henderson
states:
We must all remember that, in these ICWA cases, there are
the rights of the parents to consider, the rights of the Indian
children to consider, and the rights of the tribe which, by Con-
gressional edict, is to protect and preserve the Indian culture
and family. If an Indian child is removed from an Indian home
without an opportunity for cultural input by that child's tribe,
the entire purpose of the ICWA has been frustrated."
70. 44 Fed. Reg. 24,000, 24,001 RG(i) (1979).
71. 325 N.W.2d 53 (S.D. 1982).
72. Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
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The burden of proof requirement in Indian child welfare pro-
ceedings is more stringent than in non-Indian proceedings. The
standard to be used in termination of parental rights is that of
beyond a reasonable doubt continued custody will result in severe
or physical harm to the child. 73
In In re J.L.H. & P.L.L.H. ,"' the trial court used the standard
of "clear and convincing evidence" in a termination proceeding
and the case was reversed. On a second appeal after rehearing,
the lower court used the beyond a reasonable doubt standard and
the case was upheld."
In re R.M.M. 11176 was upheld on appeal after the court deter-
mined that the lower court had proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that the mother's dependency on alcohol and drugs, her
many suicide attempts, and her continual short abandonments of
the children caused a serious threat to the children's emotional
and physical well-being.
The "clear and convincing" evidence test is to be used in deter-
mining if a child should be placed in foster care." In two cases
this has been interpreted to mean that at the adjudicatory stage to
determine if a child is dependent and neglected, the clear and
convincing standard of proof is sufficient. Both cases involved
the termination of parental rights at the dispositional hearing at
which time the beyond a reasonable doubt standard was used.
One of these cases was State ex rel. S.R.78 In that case both
parents were Sioux Indians; the mother's rights were terminated
and the father was given sole custody.
In In re K.A.B.E. & K.B.E. ,7 both the adjudicatory and
dispositional hearings were held on the same day and the court
utilized both standards of proof. The clear and convincing
standard should not have been used because the court was ad-judicating the children with the purpose of terminating parental
rights, rather than placing them in foster care. In addition, the
court never made a finding that the children were Indian. There
was no mention in the case of notifying the tribe concerning its
right to intervene or taldng any other special measures required
under the Act.
73. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).
74. 299 N.W.2d 812 (S.D. 1980).
75. In re J.L.H. & P.L.L.H., 316 N.W.2d 650 (S.D. 1982).
76. 316 N.W.2d 538 (Minn. 1982).
77. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e) (1976).
78. 323 N.W.2d 885 (S.D. 1982).
79. 325 N.W.2d 840 (S.D. 1982).
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Another case that completely ignored the Act is In re Chosa.80
The mother's parental rights were terminated when she was
eighteen years old and the Minnesota Supreme Court vacated the
order on the ground that there was no indication that the
mother's parenting skills would not improve if given child-rearing
services. The trial court did not take the Act into account even
though the baby was eligible for membership in the tribe. The
supreme court said it would not consider the applicability of the
Act since the order had been vacated.
Another proposition of error often made on appeal is that
witnesses are not qualified as experts under the Act. In the case
of In re Fisher,8' the father contended the witnesses were not
qualified after his parental rights were terminated. Both witnesses
were deemed qualified; one was the casework supervisor of an In-
dian Center foster care program for three years. The other witness
was a mental health counselor for a tribe and a caseworker for the
Seattle Indian Center for two years.
The Department of Interior Guidelines on qualified witnesses
provide:
b. Persons with the following characteristics are most likely
to meet the requirements for a qualified expert witness for pur-
poses of Indian child custody proceedings:
(i) A member of the Indian child's tribe who is recognized
by the tribal community as knowledgeable in tribal customs as
they pertain to family organization and child-rearing practices.
(ii) A lay expert witness having substantial experience in
the delivery of child and family services to Indians, and exten-
sive knowledge of prevailing social and cultural standards and
child-rearing practices within the Indian child's tribe.
(ii) A professional person having substantial education
and experience in the area of his or her specialty.8 2
Ordinarily when a non-Indian appeals a case that has utilized
the Indian Child Welfare Act, he does so on the grounds that the
Act is unconstitutional. That was the ground used by the
operator of a group foster home who attempted to get permanent
custody of several members of an Indian family who had resided
at the group home with parental consent and on a tribal order. In
In re D.L.L. & C.L.L., 83 the petitioner claimed the denial of ac-
80. 290 N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 1980).
81. 643 P.2d 887 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
82. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,593 (1979).
83. 291 N.W.2d 278 (S.D. 1980).
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cess to state court was based upon "invidious racial discrimina-
tion." The appellate court said this was incorrect, that the denial
of access to state court was based solely upon the political status
of the parents and children and the quasi-sovereign nature of the
tribe. This is a discriminatory classification that is not prohibited
by the United States Constitution. 4
In In re Angus," the parents of an Indian child successfully
brought a habeas corpus proceeding for the return of their baby
from a couple attempting to adopt the child. The adoptive
parents appealed the trial court's granting of the habeas corpus
proceeding, charging that the Indian Child Welfare Act was un-
constitutional as a denial of equal protection under the fifth
amendment of the Constitution. The appellate court found the
Act constitutional and held the .protection of the integrity of
Indian families to be a permissible goal that is rationally tied to
the fulfillment of Congress' unique guardianship obligation
toward the Indians.
Conclusion
There have not been a great number of appellate cases decided
pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act. Viewing this fact op-
timistically could lead one to believe the Act is being followed
closely, and that, as a result, there are not many appeals from the
decisions of state courts. It is much more likely that there con-
tinue to be problems with large numbers of Indian children
placed in foster and adoptive homes of non-Indians. Trial judges,
attorneys, and social workers, as well as tribal officials, must take
a vital interest in this problem and attempt to work together to
develop tribal courts and Indian foster and adoptive homes that
are willing and able to help their Indian children.
It would be a great step forward if more judges shared the con-
cern for Indian children and their placement expressed by the
Montana judge deciding the case of In re M.E.M. ,8 who stated:
Each individual is an amalgam of the predominant religious,
linguistic, ancestral and educational influences existent in his
or her surroundings. Indian people, whether residing on a
reservation or not, are immersed in an environment which is in
84. Id. at 281.
85. 655 P.2d 208 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
86. 635 P.2d 1313 (Mont. 1981).
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most respects antithetical to their traditions. Furthermore the
cultural diversity among Indian tribes is unquestionably pro-
found yet often not fully appreciated or adequately protected
in our society. Our Constitution recognizes "the distinct and
unique cultural heritage of the American Indians and is com-
mitted in its educational goals to the preservation of their
cultural integrity." Preservation of Indian culture is un-
doubtedly threatened and thereby thwarted as the size of any
tribal community dwindles. In addition to its artifacts,
language and history, the members of a tribe are its culture.
Absent the next generation, any culture is lost and necessarily
relegated, at best, to anthropological examination and
categorization. In applying our state law and the Indian Child
Welfare Act we are cognizant of our responsibility to promote
and protect the unique Indian cultures of our state for all
future generations of Montanans.87
87. Id. at 1316.
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